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MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
THOUGHT: CURRENT PROBLEMS, AUGUSTINIAN 
PROSPECTS. By Graham Walker.1 Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 1990. Pp. viii, 189. $25.00. 
Michael P. Zucker! 2 
Graham Walker attempts the prima facie odd-if not bi-
zarre-enterprise of attempting to convince the constitutional the~ 
ory world that St. Augustine-yes, St. Augustine-holds the keys, 
if not to the kingdom, then to the puzzles and dilemmas that beset 
the field. He must be judged to have succeeded only partially at 
best. I doubt we are about to see the City of God join Morality, 
Politics and Law or Law's Empire in the elite set of texts widely 
consulted on central issues of American constitutional theory. 
Walker thinks Augustine is our man because he thinks that the 
"normative impasses" constitutional theory has reached can be re-
solved by recourse to Augustine. Walker finds the good bishop's 
theory of politics to possess certain formal qualities needed to speak 
to our current situation. That situation, to simplify Walker's ac-
count a bit, is as follows: constitutional theory is by its nature a 
normative enterprise, prescribing how judges ought to approach 
their interpretive task, or how we, the onlookers, ought to judge 
what judges do. Broadly speaking, contemporary constitutional 
theorists can be divided into two camps, moral realists and moral 
conventionalists. The latter believe, according to Walker, that mo-
rality is "merely a matter of socially fabricated conventions" or that 
morality is "ultimately groundless." The conventionalist position 
amounts to the more sinister sounding "nihilist skepticism," how-
ever, because "nihilism is the actuating premise of conventional-
ism." Moral realists, on the other hand, "regard the good, 
whatever it may be, as a reality whose existence is independent of 
human artifice." As he sometimes says, the realists see morality as 
"really real"; realists also hold to "the possibility of the human 
mind's actually attaining some real if incomplete glimpse at the na-
ture of goodness." 
The distinction between moral realism and moral convention-
alism is, according to Walker, far more fundamental than the more 
common ways of classifying constitutional theories-liberal-con-
servative; activist-restraintist; originalist-non-originalist-that one 
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finds in the literature. For one thing, the realist-conventionalist di-
chotomy cuts across the other classificatory schemes. Robert Bork 
and William Rehnquist, conservative, restraintist, originalists share 
moral conventionalism with Lawrence Tribe, Michael Perry and 
John Hart Ely, who are one and all liberal, activist and non-
originalists. The realist-conventionalist distinction not only makes 
for strange bedfellows, but, Walker argues, it brings out better the 
impasses into which the various forms of constitutional theory have 
fallen. Probably the strongest analysis in the book is Walker's dem-
onstration of the untenability of constitutional theory built on skep-
tical nihilism. "This conventionalism fails its constitutional 
adherents." The problem derives from the "inescapably normative 
and prescriptive" aim of constitutional theory, an aim which cannot 
be satisfied if one begins with the premises of conventionalism. Ni-
hil ex nihil. This problem equally besets the conventionalists of left 
and right, the activists and the restraintists. 
Walker clearly prefers the moral realist position, at least for 
the reason that it alone can satisfy the logical requirements of a 
normative theory, although also because he is convinced that moral 
realism is otherwise better as well. Nonetheless, it is significant that 
Walker's argument on behalf of moral realism hardly extends be-
yond drawing it out as a necessary presupposition of the enterprise 
of constitutional theory. 
Moral realists, like Michael Moore or Sotiros Barber or per-
haps Ronald Dworkin, also share in the normative impasse of the 
field, however. The chief problems seem to be two: the realist affir-
mation of moral reality appears to encourage a degree of confidence 
in our access to moral reality that goes beyond what the uncertain-
ties and ambiguities of moral issues as we experience them would 
justify; and secondly, "the mind-set of moral realism instinctively 
collapses politics and law into morality," and thus loses the special 
character of law as law. 
Walker sees the impasse of constitutional theory, then, very 
much in Goldilocks's terms: the conventionalists are too pessimis-
tic regarding access to moral reality and the realists too optimistic 
for either side to sustain the enterprise of constitutional theory. Au-
gustine provides the answer that is "just right." He affirms a moral 
realist position that secures some kind of stable access to moral 
truth, and yet, through his doctrine of the fall, saves himself from 
falling into the "too much" of our contemporary realists. The fall 
has produced a vitiated nature and a vitiated humanity; we see 
moral truth, but "only through a glass darkly." The sphere of poli-
tics and law, according to Augustine and Walker, cannot be a 
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sphere of ultimate moral concern-the central drama of human 
existence, a drama of salvation-goes on elsewhere. The ends of 
public life are thus lower and more limited than a full-blown realist 
like Moore, Dworkin, or Cicero might affirm. Walker's Augustini-
anism culminates in a doctrine of restraint, then, in practice perhaps 
not that different from the restraint of Bork or Rehnquist but 
grounded very differently. 
Just how restrained in practice, or how much or little Walker's 
position would differ from Bork's, is difficult to say because for a 
book in constitutional theory it is remarkably silent about the Con-
stitution. Walker proceeds at a very "high level" throughout, i.e., 
at a level that hardly gets to specifics of constitutional issues at all. 
This must be judged a serious flaw in a work that claims to give a 
field defining guidelines. At the very least Walker needs to develop 
his "Augustinian perspectives" in a far more fine-grained manner 
before many will be prepared to join him in his enthusiasm. 
Nonetheless, Walker's effort surely must be judged an interest-
ing one, surely not a run-of-the-mill one. Strange as his chief pro-
posal seems at first, on second thought it seems less out of the way, 
or at least no more out of the way than such matters as Dworkin's 
theory of judicial interpretation as a chain novel or Michael Perry's 
idea that judges should behave like Biblical prophets. For reasons 
that Walker partly elucidates, constitutional theory has been driven 
toward an explicit search for a philosophic grounding, and only 
mere modernist prejudice could rule out of court in advance think-
ers of the depth of Augustine. Is there anything worse about taking 
Augustine seriously than building a theory of the Constitution on 
John Rawls, as, for example, David Richards has done, or on Rob-
ert Nozick as somebody or other must have done by now? 
Nonetheless, certain deficiencies in Walker's performance must 
be noted, which together add up to a failure to make a sufficient 
case for Augustine. It is not enough to say that if true, Augustine 
fits the formal requirements of a "just right" constitutional theory. 
We require far more than Walker gives by way of reasons as to why 
we should accept or take seriously Augustine's theory of politics 
and law in general, much less why it ought to be considered applica-
ble to the American Constitution in particular. Walker, in other 
words, needs not merely to restate Augustine's doctrine, but to give 
us reasons to believe that it is true. 
Walker hurts his own case by leaving Augustine's doctrine in 
the heavily Biblical and theological language in which it was origi-
nally put. Only occasionally does Walker make slight suggestions 
as to how this doctrine might be commended to more modem, more 
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secular thinking. I found it surprising that Walker did not make 
more use of Reinhold Niebuhr, who succeeded admirably where 
Walker has failed-in supplying an interpretation of politics 
roughly Augustinian in inspiration and character, but restated as a 
philosophical anthropology, and thus available outside the circle of 
faith in which Walker's Augustine remains more or less trapped. 
Niebuhr has shown that it can be done, although he paid no partic-
ular attention to issues of judicial role and constitutional interpreta-
tion. Walker would have done well to have followed his path. 
